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1  Truth as good  
According to William James: 
Truth is one species of the good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct 
from good, and coordinate with it. The true is the name for whatever proves itself to 
be good in the way of belief. (1995 [1907]: 42) 
Recent expressions of similar thoughts include: 
It is uncontroversial that true belief is epistemically good. (DePaul 2001: 177) 
Truth is indeed a property of our beliefs that we value. (Engel 2009: 188) 
True beliefs are valuable. (Horwich 2010: 56) 
It should be uncontroversial that we do and should value true believing. (Jones 1997: 
423)  
True belief is valuable. (Kvanvig 2003: xiv) 
It is good to believe what is true. (Lynch 2004b: 12) 
True belief is desirable. (Schantz 2007: 309)  
                                                 
* Thanks to Conor McHugh for detailed feedback on earlier versions of this papers. Thanks also to 
Jonathan Way, anonymous referees, and audiences at Aberdeen, Lund, Reading, and Southampton for 
comments on the material and discussion of the issues it concerns.   2 
All true beliefs probably have some intrinsic value simply in virtue of being true. 
(Zagzebski 2003: 24) 
Numerous other philosophers make similar claims.
1 
Following Lynch (2004a: 499), one might try to capture the thought here with 
the following evaluative principle: 
(TG)  For any p: it is good to believe that p if and only if it is true that p.
2 
According to (TG), it is good to believe that Spinoza was Dutch, that Wim Wenders 
directed Paris, Texas, that camellias enjoy an acid soil, and so on, while it is not good 
to believe that Leibniz was Irish, that Stanley Kubrick directed The Conversation, that 
heathers enjoy an alkaline soil, and so on.
3 
It is important to stress that, according to (TG), what is valuable is believing 
truly irrespective of what is believed. That is, (TG) attributes to true belief content-
independent value. Suppose it matters whether the wheat needs harvesting. If the 
wheat does indeed need harvesting, it would be a good thing to believe this. While the 
proponent of (TG) does not deny that believing a certain truth can be good given the 
importance of having a belief about the relevant subject matter, she claims that, in 
addition, believing the truth is valuable as such, quite apart from the subject matter. 
  If (TG) is true, this might tell us something deep and important about truth; 
indeed, it is commonplace to object to certain theories of truth on the grounds that 
they do not do justice to or conflict with truth’s being valuable. Instead, or in addition, 
one might think that (TG) reflects something about the essential nature of belief, 
                                                 
1 See David 2005b; Fantl and McGrath 2009: 165–170; Goldman 1986; Loewer 1993; McHugh 2012; 
Morris1992; Pritchard 2010: 154–155; Putnam 1981; Railton 1994; Riggs 2002. 
2 Not all those cited above explicitly endorse both directions of this biconditional, though many of their 
comments suggest that they would do so. In any event, the part of (TG) which I shall challlenge, 
namely, its right-to-left conditional, is the part they explicitly endorse. 
3 The idea that it is good to believe the truth is related to, though distinct from, the idea that the aim or 
goal of belief is truth. For discussion, see Whiting 2012. 
The idea that it is good to believe the truth is related to, though distinct from, the idea that a 
norm of truth governs belief, such as that one should believe the truth. For discussion, see Whiting 
2010.   3 
something which an adequate theory of that psychological state or attitude must 
accommodate. One might also appeal to (TG) in attempting to account for the source 
and force of epistemic norms, for example, that one ought to believe what the 
evidence supports. According to teleological views, which are close to orthodoxy in 
epistemology, epistemic norms are instructions or rules the following of which 
promotes or is a means to securing a certain good. If (TG) is correct, that good might 
be true belief.  
In what follows, I shall focus on neither (TG)’s implications nor its 
explanatory significance. Instead, I shall address the prior issue of whether one should 
accept the principle in the first place. To anticipate, while I do not deny that it is 
sometimes, even often, good to believe the truth, I shall reject (TG) – it is not the case 
that it is good to believe each and any truth, no matter what it concerns. The principal 
objection to (TG), which I shall introduce below, is familiar from the literature but I 
shall consider a number of responses to it which have received little, if any, critical 
attention. The aim is not to demonstrate conclusively that (TG) is mistaken but to 
muster considerations which speak against it so as to motivate a reassessment of the 
competing considerations which philosophers offer in its support. In doing so, I shall 
argue that those considerations do not in fact support (TG) but instead point toward a 
superficially similar though quite distinct principle, namely: 
(FB)  For any p: it is bad to believe that p if and only if it is false that p.
4 
According to (FB), it is bad to believe that Descartes was English, that Werner 
Herzhog directed Down by Law, that magnolias enjoy alkaline soil, and so on, while it 
                                                 
4 I shall assume that, if a proposition is not true, it is false. Nothing in what follows hangs on this. To 
allow for truth-value gaps, one could simply replace talk of its being false that p with talk of its not 
being true that p. According to the account which results, it is bad to believe a proposition if and only if 
it is not true.   4 
is not bad to believe that Hume was Scottish, that Hal Hartley directed Henry Fool, 
that azaleas enjoy acid soil, and so on.  
One of the aims of this paper to introduce (FB) and to suggest that it is 
defensible, at least in the face of the objection considered here. Thus, I shall conclude, 
there is an interesting asymmetry – deserving of more investigation – between truth 
and falsity, namely, that while truth is not always good, falsity is always bad. More 
carefully, while believing the truth does not have content-independent value, 
believing the false has content-independent disvalue. 
  (FB) is surprisingly neglected. I know of no work in which it is advanced or 
considered independently of (TG). Typically both critics and advocates of (TG) either 
ignore (FB) completely or lump it together with (TG).
5 Perhaps there is a guiding 
assumption that the idea that false belief is bad is equivalent to the idea that true belief 
is good, or at least that they stand or fall together. One of the aims of this paper is to 
show that these assumptions are mistaken.  
 
2  Preliminary matters 
Before turning to the problems facing (TG), there are some preliminary matters to 
attend to. First, there are various ways to unpack claims such as that it is good to 
believe the truth (cf. David 2005a; David 2005b). One can distinguish the following 
principles according to the scope of the evaluative expressions and quantifiers 
involved: 
(TG
1)  For any p: (it is good to believe that p) if and only if it is true 
that p. 
                                                 
5 For example, neither Kvanvig (2008) nor Grimm (2008) in their discussions of the idea that true 
belief is valuable consider the disvalue or otherwise of false belief. Elsewhere, when defending the 
value of truth, Kvanvig (2003: 38–42), simply does not mention falsity and, in later remarks on what is 
of value ‘from a purely intellectual point of view’ (54), refers to ‘getting to the truth and avoiding 
error’ only as a package.   5 
 (TG
2)  For any p: it is good (to believe that p if and only if it is true 
that p). 
 (TG
3)  It is good (for any p: to believe that p if and only if it is true that 
p). 
In a similar fashion, one can distinguish various versions of (FB). 
Since it is true that granite is an igneous rock, it follows from (TG
1) that it is 
good to believe that granite is an igneous rock. And since it is false that granite is a 
sedimentary rock, it follows from (TG
1) that it is not good to believe this.  
Though (TG
1) might imply (TG
2), the converse does not hold. According to 
(TG
2), what is good is either believing a proposition and that proposition’s being true 
or not believing a proposition and that proposition’s not being true, and what is not 
good is either believing a proposition and that proposition’s not being true or not 
believing a proposition and that proposition’s being true. If a subject believes (truly) 
that Cameron is Prime Minister, it does not follow from (TG
2) that her so believing is 
good, any more than it follows that Cameron’s being Prime Minister is good. 
According to (TG
3), what is good is believing all and only truths, which is to 
say nothing whatsoever about the value or otherwise of believing any particular truth. 
If Marlowe wrote Hamlet and Johnson believes this, it follows from (TG
3) neither that 
this combination is good nor that Johnson’s so believing is good. Though (TG
1) and 
(TG
2) might imply (TG
3), the converse clearly does not hold. It is consistent with 
(TG
3) that nothing less than believing every truth is good. 
A shortcoming in both (TG
2) and (TG
3) is that they fail to make it clear that, 
when a belief is false, the defect lies with the believer, not the world. That is, the 
reason it is not good when a subject believes that the sky is falling is not the sky’s not   6 
falling but her believing that it is.
6 In contrast, (TG
1) makes it clear that, when a 
proposition is false, what is not good is its being believed, rather than its being false.  
As my introductory remarks indicate, the primary focus of this paper is (TG
1), 
and I take it that it is some version of this principle which most of the authors cited 
above advance.
7 If the objection I introduce in the following section undermines 
(TG
1), it might also undermine (TG
2), though it does not thereby undermine (TG
3). 
However, if I am right that there is no content-independent value in believing a 
particular truth, one might wonder how there could be content-independent value in 
believing every truth. Be that as it may, for the remainder, when discussing (TG) and 
(FB), I shall interpret them in accordance with (TG
1) and the corresponding version of 
(FB).  
  The next matter to address is what kind of value (TG) attributes to true belief. 
It is common to distinguish different sorts of value, and true belief might have one 
sort but not others. It is clear that the alleged value of true belief could not be hedonic, 
aesthetic or moral, not least because that value is supposed to be content-independent. 
Philosophers frequently suggest that true belief is epistemically valuable (cf. DePaul 
2001: 77; Feldman 2000: 683). But this raises thorny issues as to what counts as an 
epistemic value. Philosophers almost as frequently suggest that what is of epistemic 
value is what appears valuable from the epistemic ‘point of view’ or ‘perspective’ (cf. 
Alston 1989: 81ff; Baehr 2012: 4). But this in turn raises equally thorny issues as to 
what counts as an epistemic perspective. Rather than seek to resolve these issues, 
which is beyond the scope of this paper, I shall trade on the familiarity of the notion 
of epistemic value and assume that we have some grasp of it. For now, note only that 
being of epistemic value need not be opposed to being of value simpliciter; on the 
                                                 
6 David (2005a) and Piller (2009) raise versions of this point when discussing the idea that subjects 
want or desire to believe the truth (cf. n3 above). 
7 Lynch (2005), for example, explicitly endorses (TG
1).   7 
contrary, a proponent of (TG) might claim that true belief is of value simpliciter in 
virtue of being of epistemic value.
8 
  Next, one might ask whether the value (TG) attributes to true belief is 
instrumental, that is, valuable only as a means to a valuable end, or final, that is, 
valuable as an end in itself. Most of those who advance (TG) think that the value of 
believing the truth is final (which is not to deny that so believing might also be 
instrumentally valuable). In Horwich’s words, ‘we should acknowledge that true 
belief has a non-instrumental value – a value for its own sake’ (2010: 66). It is this 
view which I shall focus on. 
Finally, it is important to stress that (TG) should be read as expressing a 
judgement, not of all-things-considered or overall value, but of pro tanto or prima 
facie value. If something is prima facie valuable, it has a value which might be 
defeated (or outweighed, or undercut, or…) in a given circumstance. For example, 
cycling to work might be prima facie good, insofar as it provides an opportunity for 
much-needed exercise, is less harmful to the environment than driving, is exhilarating, 
and so forth, but that goodness might be defeated if cycling to work were to prevent 
me from getting to the office on time, say, or result in a collision with a bus. In such a 
situation, cycling to work is not valuable overall but it remains prima facie valuable. 
Returning to the case at hand, clearly there are circumstances in which it is not 
good that a subject believes the truth. For example, Charlie’s true belief that he lacks 
social skills has a detrimental effect on his psychological health and serves only to 
aggravate the relevant problem. And Lucy’s true belief that she won the lottery is 
irrationally held in the face of all available evidence. In such cases, according to 
                                                 
8 It is consistent with (TG) that things other than true belief possess epistemic value, such as knowledge 
or understanding. Thus, (TG) does not entail monism about epistemic value.   8 
(TG)’s proponent, the prima facie goodness of believing the truth is defeated by 
competing considerations. 
 
3  Trivial pursuits 
Recall Malebranche’s disparaging remarks on the ‘learned’ who ‘turn their head into a 
kind of furniture warehouse into which they indiscriminately cram […] curiosities and 
antiques, which have no value or solidity’ (1997 [1674-1675]: xxxv).  These remarks 
point to a common objection to (TG). Many truths are utterly trivial; to believe them 
is worthless and so, contra (TG), not good.
9 Consider every truth about every hair on 
my head. It is true that this particular hair is 45mm and brushed bronze, while this one 
is 34mm and autumn sunset, and so on. While believing these things might do one no 
harm, would it really be good to believe them? It is hard to see why. Call this, the 
objection from triviality. 
What, one might ask, is it for a truth to be trivial? I do not have an informative 
(non-trivial!) answer to this question. I shall simply assume that there are some true 
beliefs which the reader, with both critics and advocates of (TG), recognises as 
concerning insignificant, unimportant matters, like the truth about the number of 
threads in my office carpet, to borrow Lynch’s example (2005b: 55), or that truth 
disjoined with an arbitrary number of arbitrary propositions, such as that the moon is 
made of cheese, or that puddles are puddles, or…. I shall add only that a truth can be 
trivial in certain circumstances and non-trivial in different circumstances. For example, 
the number of threads in the carpet is of no concern to me but it might matter to Alex, 
                                                 
9 For versions of this point, see David 2005b; Grimm 2008; Heal 1987/88; Sosa 2001.   9 
if Alex were offered one billion dollars to find out how many threads there are in the 
carpet.
10 
  A common response to the objection from triviality is to restrict (TG) and 
claim that what is good is believing truths concerning matters of ‘interest’ or 
‘significance’ (cf. Alston 2005: 28; Goldman 2001): 
(TG
M) For any p: if it matters whether p, it is good to believe that p if and 
only if it is true that p. 
I shall set (TG
M) aside, since to restrict the principle in this way is simply to give up 
the claim that true belief has content-independent value. The concern of this paper lies 
with attempts to hold on to that claim in the face of the objection from triviality.
11 
A different move, which Wedgwood proposes (2002: 273), following 
Chisholm (1977: 14), is to restrict (TG) to those propositions one considers: 
(TG
C)  For any p: if one considers whether p, it is good to believe that p if and 
only if it is true that p. 
Unlike (TG
M), (TG
C) still attributes to certain true beliefs content-independent value. 
The value of believing a truth is conditional upon one’s having considered it, but not 
on what one believes or considers. 
Many, perhaps most, beliefs are held or acquired unreflectively or implicitly, 
and so without consideration. Consider, for example, all the beliefs one acquires 
through perception. Suppose that certain such beliefs are true. For all (TG
C) says, it 
might not be good to have them. Or suppose that certain such beliefs are false. (TG
C) 
                                                 
10 To say that there are possible circumstances in which it would be good for a subject to believe a truth 
is, of course, not to say that in the actual circumstances it is good for her to do so (cf. Heal 1987/88). 
11 (TG
M) is of little use to teleologists who seek to account for the epistemic norms to which believing 
is subject by presenting them as specifying the means to securing the relevant value, since those norms 
do not appear to govern only beliefs concerning interesting or significant matters. For this point, see 
Grimm 2009. Something similar can be said of (TG
C), introduced below.   10 
does not deliver the verdict that it is not good to have them. These points do not show 
(TG
C) to be false but they do suggest that the principle is too weak. 
  More importantly, it is doubtful that restricting the claim about the content-
independent value of truth to those propositions one considers really speaks to the 
objection from triviality. If one feels its pull, as all those participating in the debate 
appear to do, one might well think that, for some trivial truth one considers, believing 
it is neither better nor worse than not believing it – precisely because it is trivial.  
  A proponent of (TG
C) might reply by reminding us that consideration is a 
purposive activity which at least in part aims to result in true beliefs. Thus, for one 
who considers a certain matter, believing the truth concerning it is good, even if that 
matter is trivial, insofar as so believing satisfies one’s aim in considering it. 
One might ask how, if a truth is not worth believing, the mere fact that one 
considers it could make it so. The proposed reply assumes that the value of an end – 
in this case, true belief – derives from the value of pursuing it – in this case, 
consideration – which is surely to get things back to front. The value of a pursuit is 
parasitic on the value of its end; in which case, if the end has no value, the pursuit has 
no value.
12 Thus, one does not answer the objection from triviality by restricting the 
claim that true belief is good to those propositions one considers. 
The standard response to the objection from triviality is to remind us that, as 
stressed above, the value (TG) attributes to true belief is prima facie (see Fantl and 
McGrath 2009: 165–167; Horwich 2010: 59–60; Kvanvig 2003: 41; Lynch 2004a: 
501). The fact that some truths are trivial and thus not worth believing does not cast 
doubt on (TG); it is just that the triviality of a candidate belief defeats the value of its 
truth. 
                                                 
12 Perhaps there are theories of value according to which this is not so. It would be a cost for the 
proponent of (TG
C) if her defence of it were to rest upon a highly controversial theory of value.   11 
At this point, there is a danger of reaching a standoff between those who hold 
that there is prima facie value in believing the truth, which is defeated when that 
belief is trivial, and those who hold that there is no such value at all. To make 
progress, it is worth thinking about what kinds of considerations might, according to 
the proponent of (TG), defeat the prima facie value of true belief when that belief 
concerns a trivial matter. Perhaps she has in mind something like the following line of 
thought. For finite beings, having any particular belief is at the expense of having 
others and draws on limited cognitive resources. Thus, the prima facie value of a true 
belief must be measured against what one might call the cognitive cost of forming and 
maintaining that belief. While it is good to believe a given truth, doing so comes at 
cognitive cost and that cost is not worth paying, so to speak, when the truth in 
question is trivial. 
Recall that, because we are finite, all our beliefs come at some cognitive cost. 
So, the proponent of (TG) who advances the above line of thought must hold that the 
mere fact that a proposition is true is never enough to make it good (overall) to 
believe it; for believing that proposition to be good, doing so must bring additional 
theoretical or practical benefits. It is hard to see the difference between that position 
and a weaker one according to which true belief is, as such, value-neutral and whether 
or not there is value in believing a given truth turns on the theoretical or practical 
importance of that belief, which in turn depends on what it is about, that is, on its 
content. 
Relatedly, the above line of thought presents (TG) as the claim that it is good 
to believe a given truth, considered apart from the cognitive costs of doing so. But, as 
Baehr argues, ‘the costs are a direct function of certain deep features of our cognitive 
nature’ (2012: 10). In which case, he asks, ‘why think that for the judgement in   12 
question [(TG)] to be true from a ceteris paribus standpoint it must abstract away from 
the relevant essential features of our cognitive nature?’ To put the same point 
differently, what is of epistemic value is what appears valuable from the epistemic 
perspective. But that is the perspective of finite beings with limited cognitive 
resources. So, what is of epistemic value, prima facie or otherwise, cannot be 
determined apart from facts about such finitude and limitations. Hence, cognitive 
costs cannot be independent considerations which defeat the epistemic value which 
true beliefs would otherwise have. 
Finally, the story which appeals to cognitive costs underestimates the force of 
the original objection. Let us simply stipulate that a given believer has plenty of room, 
as it were, for forming beliefs and so that coming to believe a particular piece of trivia 
would not be costly for her. It remains hard to see what value there is in her doing so. 
Suppose that a subject could form a true belief about the colour and length of a 
particular hair on my head at little to no cost. While it might not be a bad thing were 
she to do so, it would surely not be a good thing.  
Of course, a proponent of (TG) might not share this estimation. Following 
Horwich (2010: 59n2) and Kvanvig (2008: 209-210), she might point out that God is 
the ‘cognitive ideal’. God is omniscient and so believes all and only truths, including 
all those about the number of threads in my carpet, the colour and length of each hair 
on my head, and so on. Since God is omnipotent, these beliefs come at no cognitive 
cost. And presumably God’s omniscience is part of what makes God good. Perhaps 
this supports the idea that, for any truth, it would be good to believe it were it not for 
the cognitive costs of doing so. 
If God is indeed the cognitive ideal, insofar as God believes all and only truths, 
this at most supports (TG
3). As discussed earlier, there is no immediate route from   13 
(TG
3) to (TG
1), the present concern. Furthermore, omniscience is not simply a matter 
of believing all truths but of knowing all truths. For all I say here, from the fact that a 
proposition is true, it might follow that it is good to know it; it does not follow from 
this that it is good to have an attitude toward that proposition which falls short of 
knowledge. Finally, recall that, on many traditional conceptions, God creates and 
sustains the universe. Thus, one might think that, for God, no truth is trivial; it does 
not follow from this that, for the rest of us, no truth is trivial. 
  Elsewhere, Kvanvig tells a rather different story in defence of (TG) about how 
the prima facie value of true belief might be weighed alongside other considerations. 
According to Kvanvig, the goodness of believing a given truth is defeated if it 
‘doesn’t do much explanatory work for us’ or ‘doesn’t help our overall understanding 
of the universe much’ (2009: 339). So, the suggestion goes, taking into account only 
the truth of a proposition, it is good to believe it but, taking into account the fact that it 
does no explanatory work and does not further our understanding, it is not good to 
believe that proposition.  
  Unfortunately, for the proponent of (TG), understood in the way Kvanvig 
recommends, the principle amounts to the claim that it is good to believe the truth 
only if doing so brings about some kind of theoretical benefit. But this is precisely to 
concede that believing the truth is not itself good; what is good is being explanatory or 
furthering understanding, not being true.  
To put the same point differently, to say that some feature is prima facie 
valuable is to say that it is good for something to possess it unless certain features are 
present which defeat that value (by outweighing or undercutting it). For example, to 
say that having a successful career is prima facie valuable is to say that it is good to 
have a successful career unless it leads to poor health, to strained relations with one’s   14 
immediate family, and the like. But, for Kvanvig, it is good to believe a truth unless 
certain features are absent—such as being explanatory—which is to say that the 
goodness of true belief is conditional upon the presence of such good-making features. 
But this is just to concede that true belief is not itself good. In trying to defend (TG), 
Kvanvig unwittingly relinquishes it. 
  At this point, a defender of (TG) might adopt a more offensive, less defensive, 
approach. To make the objection from triviality, she might complain, is to import 
foreign considerations to the issues at hand. Specifically, the objection is made from 
the practical perspective; it is only from that perspective that trivial truths appear not 
worth believing and, she continues, it is no surprise that the epistemic value so 
believing possesses does not show up when one adopts it. 
  This does not get (TG)’s proponent very far. Many of those who advance the 
objection from triviality think of themselves as precisely adopting the epistemic 
perspective. Consider: 
If you propose an evening memorizing the phone book for Topeka, Kansas, and I 
decline, have I really missed an opportunity to enrich myself, from an epistemic point 
of view? (2008: 726; cf. Baehr 2012: 4)  
As these remarks show, the objection just does not appear to be one which can only be 
made from the practical perspective. Setting aside practical considerations, one might 
say, there seems to be no value in believing the truth about the length and colour of a 
certain hair on my head. Of course, one might not share this estimation but it does not 
follow, at least without further ado, that this is because one does not share the 
perspective from which it is made. 
Moreover, the above line of thought seems simply to assume that the epistemic 
perspective is one from which true beliefs appear valuable, which is to beg the 
question. Indeed, the issue at hand is in part one concerning how exactly to   15 
characterise the epistemic perspective – by considering what appears to be of value 
when adopting it. In which case, that perspective is not a neutral datum to which 
(TG)’s proponent can appeal in an effort to block the objection from triviality. 
In view of this, consider another of Kvanvig’s proposals concerning the kinds 
of considerations that might defeat the prima facie value of true belief. According to 
Kvanvig, ‘We are finite beings, with limited time and resources for enhancing our 
well-being’. As a result, ‘our general interest in enhancing our well-being comes into 
conflict with our general interest in the truth’ (2003: 41; cf. Lynch 2005b: 120). When 
it does, the value of believing a truth concerning some trivial matter is defeated by the 
disvalue which results from failing to promote one’s well-being (for example, if 
measuring the hairs on my head so as to form true beliefs as to their lengths were at 
the expense of eating a healthy meal or spending time working on a project which 
would further my career).  
Kvanvig here assumes that believing trivial truths seems worthless only from 
the practical perspective or that it is practical considerations which defeat the prima 
facie value of believing a given truth. This assumption, as we have just seen, is 
mistaken. Thus, Kvanvig does not take the full measure of the objection from 
triviality. Suppose that believing a particular trivial truth would not interfere with 
one’s well-being. There is nothing else one could do right now, let us stipulate, but 
count the number of threads in the carpet in my office. Surely, while it might not be 
bad to form a true belief about this matter, it would not be positively good to do so. 
It seems, then, that none of the ways considered here of cashing out the idea 
that believing the truth possesses prima facie value which is defeated in the case of 
trivial beliefs are successful; they appear either to give the wrong explanation as to   16 
why trivial truths are not worth believing or to give up on the very idea that true belief 
has prima facie value. 
  In light of the objection from triviality, there is reason to reject (TG). The 
objection is not, I admit, decisive and perhaps there are further things which a 
proponent of (TG) might say in response to it. Moreover, the force of that objection 
and of responses to it depend to some extent on estimations which might not be shared. 
Rather than pursue these matters further, I shall consider how well-motivated (TG) is. 
If it lacks motivation, then so does the search for solutions to the above objection.  
 
4  Falsity as bad 
Before moving on, note that I have only challenged one half of (TG). Still standing is: 
  (TG’)  For any p: it is good to believe that p only if it is true that p. 
I accept (TG’). It seems right that, if it is not true that Thomas Pynchon wrote White 
Noise, it is not good to believe it. Indeed, I shall argue for a stronger principle, which 
implies (TG’), namely: 
(FB)  For any p: it is bad to believe that p if and only if it is false that p. 
Though superficially similar to (TG), this principle is quite distinct. Since it is true 
that camellias are ericaceous, it follows from (TG) that it is good to believe that 
camellias are ericaceous, while (FB) only implies that it is not bad to do so. Since it is 
false that roses are ericaceous, it follows from (FB) that it is bad to believe that roses 
are ericaceous, while (TG) only implies that it is not good to do so. That the 
difference between (TG) and (FB) makes a difference will become apparent in the 
discussion that follows.
13 
                                                 
13 Replacing (TG) with (FB) has implications for the teleological approach to epistemic norms. If she 
accepts (FB), a teleologist should present epistemic norms as rules which specify the means, not to 
securing something of value, but to avoiding something of disvalue, namely, false belief. This would 
seem to commit her to the view that epistemic norms involve permissions or negative obligations—one   17 
Like (TG), (FB) is to be read as expressing a judgement of prima facie value 
or, rather, disvalue. Though it is prima facie bad to believe falsely that one is a likely 
candidate for a certain job, it might be good overall so to believe if doing so increases 
one’s confidence, which thereby helps one to secure the job. Likewise, though it is 
prima facie not bad to believe truly that one holds a winning lottery ticket, it might be 
bad overall if the belief is irrationally held in the face of statistical evidence.
14 
 
5  Millian considerations 
In this section, I shall examine certain informal considerations adduced in support of 
(TG) on the basis of what one might call a ‘Millian’ strategy, namely, offering as 
evidence for what is valuable claims about what is valued.
15 One might have qualms 
about such a strategy but, for present purposes, I shall grant its legitimacy and instead 
suggest that the relevant evidence points, not to (TG), but to (FB). In the next section, 
I shall arrive at the same verdict by examining more principled considerations. 
  In support of (TG), Lynch writes: 
Nobody likes to be wrong. If anything is a truism, this is. And it suggests that we 
value believing the truth. Roughly speaking, we think it is good to believe the truth, 
and not to believe the false. (2004a: 499)  
In response, consider how one should understand the claim that nobody likes to be 
wrong. It might mean: if one believes a certain proposition, one dislikes that 
                                                                                                                                            
may believe that p if one has evidence that p, for example, or one should not believe that p if one has 
evidence that not-p – but not positive obligations – for example, one should believe that p if one has 
evidence that p. For arguments in support of the view that there are no positive epistemic obligations, 
see Feldman 2000: §2; Nelson 2010: 83–102; Whiting 2012. 
14 It is important to stress that in the previous section I did not object to the distinction between prima 
facie and all-things-considered value, or to bringing that distinction to bear on principles such as (TG), 
but only to the suggestion that appealing to that distinction saves (TG) from the objection from 
triviality. Hence, it is legitimate, when discussing (FB), to appeal to that distinction to account for cases 
like those just mentioned. 
15 Cf. ‘The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually 
desire it’ (Mill 1998 [1861]: 81).   18 
proposition’s being false. But this attitude seems childish or stubborn.
16 Maybe some 
of us have such an attitude toward their beliefs but it is hardly a truism that everybody 
does. And, insofar as we should not have that attitude, it provides no support for 
claims about what is desirable or valuable. 
  Perhaps instead the claim that nobody likes to be wrong should be understood 
to mean: one dislikes believing a proposition if it is false. That seems right. But it 
does not follow, as Lynch claims, ‘that we value believing the truth’ in a sense that 
would support (TG). Suppose that I dislike not winning marathons, since I find it 
embarrassing. Does it follow that I like to win? No – perhaps I find the attention that 
involves equally embarrassing. I prefer to come somewhere in the middle or not to 
race at all. Likewise, from the fact that I do not like to believe a proposition when it is 
false, all that follows is that I disvalue false belief, not that I value true belief. These 
are not equivalent attitudes. A person who values the truth will, other things being 
equal, seek it out, but a person who disvalues the false might forgo believing 
altogether.  
  Nor does it follow from the truism, as Lynch suggests, that we think it good 
‘not to believe the false’. Suppose I disvalue the false, in the sense that, if a 
proposition is false, I think it is bad to believe it. With respect to not believing that 
proposition, I might only think that it is not bad, not that it is good. Something can fail 
to be bad without being good. 
                                                 
16 I am indebted to David (2005b) and Piller (2009) here, who make similar points with respect to a 
slightly different claim (cf. n6 above). Note that Piller discusses (2009: 205–206) the above remarks by 
Lynch but sees no satisfactory way of interpreting the alleged truism. I shall offer one such way in a 
moment.   19 
So, Lynch’s truism does not establish that we take true belief to be good. 
Nonetheless, it does point to the superficially similar thought which (FB) embodies, 
namely, that we take false belief to be bad.
17 
One might wonder if I am placing too much weight on Lynch’s choice of 
example. Doesn’t ‘Everybody likes to be right’ equally express a truism, one which 
points to (TG)?  
In response, consider how one should understand the claim that everybody 
likes to be right. It might mean: for any truth, a subject desires or thinks it good to 
believe it. So understood, however, the claim seems false, not truistic.
18 As we have 
seen, unless a proposition concerns a matter of importance or significance, we do not 
desire or think it good to believe it. 
Perhaps the claim that everybody likes to be right should be understood to 
mean: if one believes a certain proposition, one desires or thinks it good for that 
proposition to be true. But this attitude looks like one of dogmatism.
19 Maybe some of 
us have such an attitude toward some of our beliefs but it is hardly a truism that 
everybody does. And, insofar as we should not have that attitude, it provides no 
support for claims about what is desirable or valuable. 
Perhaps the claim should be understood to mean: if p, one thinks it preferable 
to believe that p than to believe that not-p. So understood, I accept the claim, but it 
points to (FB), not (TG). That one thinks it undesirable to believe falsely suffices to 
explain the preference. 
                                                 
17 Admittedly, this consideration supports only the claim that it is bad to believe a proposition if it is 
false, not the claim that it is bad to believe a proposition only if it is false. Nonetheless, some of the 
other considerations I discuss in due course support the latter claim. 
18 Of course, Lynch’s original claim (‘Nobody likes to be wrong’) establishes at most a presumption in 
favour of (FB); it might also turn out to be wrong. Since the focus of the present section is the 
considerations which motivate philosophers to advance (TG) and its kin – in the face of the objection 
from triviality – I shall postpone this matter until later. 
19 Again, I am indebted here to David (2005b) and Piller (2009).   20 
Consider next Kvanvig’s case in support of (TG). He invites us to imagine a 
situation in which one’s beliefs are ‘empirically adequate’, that is, they ‘will never be 
revealed to be false in virtue of some false prediction’ one makes on the basis of them 
‘about the course of experience’. Empirically adequate beliefs have the same practical 
utility as true beliefs. Nonetheless, Kvanvig continues, were one to learn ‘that one’s 
beliefs are empirically adequate but untrue’ this would generate ‘a negative affective 
sense of having been duped’ (2003: 39-42).
20 
This seems right but one must ask what it shows. Suppose that one does not 
like the idea of having empirically adequate but untrue beliefs. It follows that the 
disvalue one attaches to false beliefs defeats any value one attaches to empirically 
adequate beliefs. This does not show that one values true belief but only that one 
disvalues false belief. Hence, like Lynch’s, Kvanvig’s considerations do not support 
(TG) but (FB). 
  Lynch appeals to similar ideas when pointing out that, if one had to choose 
‘between living in the actual world or the world created for us by Descartes’ 
imaginary evil demon’, one would choose the actual world, even though one’s beliefs 
in the demon world would have the same instrumental value as they do in the actual 
world (2004a: 502-503). One might accept this but it does not establish what Lynch 
takes it to. Reflection on the scenario shows that we disvalue believing falsehoods or, 
as Lynch himself puts it, that we ‘find the prospect of being undetectably wrong […] 
disturbing’. It does not, however, show what Lynch needs it to show, namely that we 
value believing the truth, no matter what it concerns. So, reflection on radical 
sceptical scenarios points, contra Lynch, to (FB) not (TG). Lynch appears to treat 
                                                 
20 To pick up on a previous issue, Kvanvig’s remarks might seem to be suggesting that, on discovering 
that one’s (empirically adequate) belief that p is false, one has a con-attitude toward its being the case 
that not-p. I shall assume, however, that he is suggesting that, on discovering this, one has a con-
attitude toward one’s believing that p.   21 
disvaluing falsity and valuing truth as one and the same but it should be clear by now 
that to do so is mistaken.  
  Lynch makes an additional observation: 
Unless truth has more than instrumental value, there would be nothing wrong with 
believing trivial falsehoods, such as the proposition that 100 gazillion trillion is the 
highest number. But as Bernard Williams puts it, the falsity of a proposition is in fact 
a terminal objection to believing it. (2004a: 502; cf. Williams 1973: ch. 9)  
This is an observation to which I am sympathetic but Lynch’s principle does not 
capture it. (TG) only tells us that believing a falsehood is not good, not that it is bad. 
The Williams point supports (FB), not (TG). 
Rather than appeal directly to our attitude toward true belief in support of (TG), 
Pritchard appeals to our attitude toward something which involves true belief, namely, 
authenticity: 
The kind of life we want to lead is an authentic life – one that is in touch with the 
world – where the relationships that we form are genuine and the achievements we 
strive for are real […] It is because we value authenticity that we value truth. (2010: 
155) 
The line of thought here is that believing the truth is a constitutive part of an authentic 
existence. Since authenticity is valuable, true belief is valuable, as (TG) states. 
One might challenge this by denying that authenticity is good, or that it 
requires that one’s beliefs be true, but I shall grant Pritchard both claims. The line of 
thought does not in any event show that true belief is good for the simple reason that, 
though true belief might be necessary for authenticity, it is insufficient. To appreciate 
this, consider the following. Archie draws his bow and shoots an arrow.
21 The arrow 
is blown off course by a gust of wind but another gust blows it back on course and it 
                                                 
21 Sosa is responsible for examples of this sort (see 2007: 22).   22 
hits its target. Archie’s performance is successful but it is not an authentic 
achievement, since Archie’s hitting the target was due to manipulation and luck – he 
could easily have been missed. Now consider René. Whenever René is about to form 
a belief, an evil demon flicks a coin. If the coin lands heads, René gets a true belief; if 
it lands tails, René gets a false belief. To date, the coin has always landed heads and 
so René has many beliefs, all of which are true. Like Archie’s shot, René’s beliefs are 
accurate and on target, so to speak, but due to manipulation and luck – they could 
easily have been false. René’s perspective on the world is inauthentic – it is not, one 
might say, his own – and so the life he leads in light of it is inauthentic too. 
  It seems that having true beliefs is consistent with both authenticity and 
inauthenticity. So, if authenticity is good, the fact that believing the truth is a 
constitutive part of authenticity does not reveal believing the truth to be good when 
the other conditions for authenticity are not met. 
  In contrast, though believing falsehoods is not necessary for inauthenticity, as 
the case of René shows, it is arguably sufficient. If René’s beliefs are false, perhaps 
due to the manipulation of an evil demon, he does not have a grip on reality and the 
life he leads in light of them is inauthentic. And that suggests that believing 
falsehoods is bad, insofar as inauthenticity is bad.  
Needless to say, there is a lot more to be said about what makes for 
(in)authenticity and a full exploration of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
But appearances suggest that reflection on authenticity points not to (TG) but to (FB). 
While I do not pretend to have offered an exhaustive survey of the literature, 
none of the considerations above favour the idea that true belief is good, although all 
favour the idea that false belief is bad. Lynch, Kvanvig, and Pritchard either ignore 
the latter idea or run it together with the former.   23 
There are further Millian considerations which suggest that we think it bad to 
believe the false while we do not think it good to believe the truth, and which thereby 
support (FB) over (TG).
22 Suppose that it is false that p and true that q. Suppose 
further that one is faced with two options – not believing that p and not believing that 
q, or believing that p and believing that q. The first option, having no false belief but 
no true belief either, is surely preferable to the second, having a true belief but also a 
false belief. This indicates that truth and falsity do not, so to speak, cancel each other 
out, that we take believing a falsehood to be bad in a way that we do not take 
believing a truth to be good. Alternatively, suppose that one is faced with the 
following two options – believing that p and believing that not-p, or neither believing 
that p nor believing that not-p. Surely, the second option, abstaining from belief, is 
preferable to the first, having contradictory beliefs. The acquisition of a true belief 
does not compensate for the acquisition of a false one. The idea that believing falsely 
is bad while believing truly is not good makes sense of this.  
The considerations in the previous paragraph show that our evaluations of true 
belief and false belief, when considered apart from their subject-matter, are 
asymmetrical. This seems to provide strong Millian evidence for (FB) over (TG). 
 
6  A non-Millian consideration 
In this section, I shall focus on a more principled consideration which Lynch offers in 
support of (TG), appealing to the platitudinous connection between true belief and 
correct belief: 
Just as we evaluate actions as correct or incorrect, ‘true’ and ‘false’ are used to 
evaluate beliefs as correct or incorrect [… This suggests] that truth is a property that it 
is good for beliefs to have. Since propositions are the contents of beliefs, and it is the 
                                                 
22 This paragraph draws upon Sorensen 1988: 36–37.   24 
content of a belief, not the act of believing, that is true, we can also say that truth is 
the property that makes a proposition good to believe, or alternatively, that a belief’s 
being true is good. (2004a: 499) 
The line of thought is as follows. Correctness is an evaluative notion. Beliefs are 
correct or incorrect just insofar as they are true or false respectively. So, truth is an 
evaluative notion, which picks out a property that is good for belief.  
One might represent this argument as progressing from the following platitude: 
(C)  For any p: it is correct to believe that p if and only if it is true that p. 
to: 
(TG)  For any p: it is good to believe that p if and only if it is true that p. 
This argument is too quick. In the first instance, one might challenge the assumption 
that whether something is correct is an evaluative matter. But I shall grant to Lynch 
that the claim that something is correct is, or implies, an evaluative claim; what I shall 
deny is that it is, or implies, a positive evaluative claim.  
Something’s being correct is not always a good thing, though no doubt it 
sometimes is. For example, the claim that the use of a certain epithet is politically 
correct should surely not be understood to imply that it would be good to use that 
epithet but, at most, that it would not be bad to do so (perhaps because it would cause 
no offence). Likewise, to say that someone filled out a form correctly is not to suggest 
that she filled it out well, though it is does appear to suggest that she did not fill it out 
badly. Very roughly, to say that something is correct is to say it meets a certain 
standard. And the fact that something meets a certain standard implies that it is not 
deficient, that it is adequate or passable, not that it is positively good, as the examples 
testify. If this is right, then the transition from the platitudinous (C) to (TG) is 
unwarranted. Nonetheless, a similar transition is warranted.    25 
The claim that something is incorrect is, or implies, a negative evaluative 
claim. Something’s being incorrect is, other things being equal, a bad thing. For 
example, the claim that the use of a certain epithet is politically incorrect should 
surely be understood to imply that it would be bad to use that epithet (perhaps because 
it would cause offence). Likewise, to say that someone filled out a form incorrectly is 
to suggest that she filled it out poorly or in a bad way. Very roughly, to say that 
something is incorrect is to say it fails to meet a certain standard. And the fact that 
something fails a certain standard implies that it is deficient, that it is inadequate or 
unacceptable, as the examples testify. Note that (TG) fails to capture the idea that 
incorrectness is disvaluable. Suppose that it is false that p, and so incorrect it believe it. 
All that follows from (TG) is that it is not the case that it would be good so to believe, 
not that it would be bad. 
  So, the platitude about correctness does not support Lynch’s claims about the 
goodness of true belief. By way of contrast, consider an argument from: 
(C)  For any p: it is correct to believe that p if and only if it is true that p. 
to: 
(IC)  For any p: it is incorrect to believe that p if and only if it is false that p. 
to: 
(FB)  For any p: it is bad to believe that p if and only if it is false that p. 
This preserves the link between what is incorrect and what it would be bad to do, and 





                                                 
23 For a complementary discussion, see Whiting 2010.   26 
7  Trivial pursuits revisited 
I have argued that neither the Millian nor the more principled considerations support 
(TG); instead, both support (FB). One might, however, wonder if a version of the 
objection from triviality succeeds against (FB). In this section, I shall suggest that it 
does not. 
In the first instance, note that, for any one of the indefinite number of trivial 
truths, (FB) implies that it is not bad to believe them. This, I venture, is the right 
verdict. Typically, we think that (other things being equal), while it is not good to 
believe trivial truths, there is no harm in doing so. To say that φing is trivial is only to 
say that there is no value in φing, not that there is disvalue in φing. Drumming one’s 
fingers might be a trivial activity, and so of little worth, but it is not a bad thing to do. 
So, the fact that (FB) suggests that it is not bad to believe trivial truths counts in 
support of it, not against it.  
Nonetheless, one might object to (FB) as follows. If it is not good to believe 
trivial truths, it is not bad to believe trivial falsehoods. Suppose that I believe that I 
have 100,046 hairs on my head, when in fact I have 100,047. (FB) is mistaken, the 
objection continues, since it suggests that it would be bad to have this false belief, 
when it is neither here nor there. 
  However, unlike the objection to (TG) from trivial truths, the objection to (FB) 
from trivial falsehoods lacks force. It seems bad to believe a falsehood, even when it 
concerns a trivial matter. If I offered to fill your head with trivial truths, you would 
surely decline. In contrast, if I offered to rid your head of trivial falsehoods, you 
would surely accept. 
Of course, this is not an argument. But I have more on my side. Above I 
surveyed numerous Millian and non-Millian considerations – none were found to   27 
support (TG) and all were found to support (FB). Cumulatively, if not individually, 
they provide a strong case for the claim that it is bad to believe falsely, no matter what 
the subject-matter. 
Someone might continue to insist that it is not bad to believe trivial falsehoods. 
But merely to insist in this way is not to advance the argument. The onus is on the 
opponent of (FB) to show that the many considerations which seem to support the 
principle in fact do not, as I did with respect to (TG). Until she does so, there remains 
a presumption in favour of (FB).  
 
8  Conclusion 
Some philosophers claim that, in general, true belief is, independent of its content, 
good. I have suggested that this is mistaken. However, I suspect that those 
philosophers have confused that claim with another which sounds very much alike, 
though it is quite distinct, a claim which has a lot more going for it, namely that, in 
general, false belief is, independent of its content, bad.  
  It was not my aim to prove that it is bad to believe what is false or to disprove 
that it is good to believe what is true but rather to offer a reminder that these are two 
quite distinct claims which need to be kept apart, to make room in doing so for 
accepting one without accepting the other, and to make something of a case for 
thinking that the first, not the second, is the one to go with. Adding more and more to 
the stock of true beliefs does not make the world a better place, I have suggested, but 
removing more and more from the stock of false beliefs does. 
If it is indeed the case that believing the truth is not valuable in the way that 
believing the false is disvaluable, it would be worthwhile investigating why by  
exploring in more depth this asymmetry, and it would be equally worthwhile   28 
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